2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

6-3-2011

USA v. Michael Reynolds

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Michael Reynolds" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1145.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1145

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

HLD-141 (April 2011)

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-1752
___________
IN RE: MICHAEL CURTIS REYNOLDS,
Petitioner
____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(Related to M.D. Pa. Crim. No. 05-cr-00493)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
April 29, 2011
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, ALDISERT and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 3, 2011)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM.
Pro se petitioner, Michael Curtis Reynolds, seeks issuance of a writ of
mandamus. Reynolds’ petition is less than a model of clarity. As best can be deciphered
from his filing, Reynolds is seeking to compel the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania to grant his motion filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 36,
his request for summary judgment filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, and his motion for
bail. We will deny the petition.
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It appears that on July 13, 2007, Reynolds was found guilty by a jury of
five counts of a six-count superseding indictment. He was subsequently sentenced to 360
months imprisonment and three years supervised release, and was ordered to pay a
$500.00 special assessment. We affirmed the Judgment and Commitment in a nonprecedential opinion issued on March 18, 2010, and the Supreme Court denied Reynolds’
petition for writ of certiorari on October 4, 2010. Since receiving an unfavorable
outcome on direct appeal and having his cert. petition denied by the Supreme Court,
Reynolds has inundated the District Court with pro se motions. Several of these postjudgment motions concern what Reynolds believes to be “fraud upon the court,” and
were filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 or under Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. HartfordEmpire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1944).
The District Court recently disposed of these motions in a Memorandum
Opinion and Order entered on March 8, 2011. In its Memorandum Opinion, the District
Court made specific reference to the various miscellaneous motions – including one for
“Summary Judgment Upon Respondent [sic] Failure to Rebut Under Rule 36 Admission
of All Facts” – that Reynolds filed in conjunction with his Rule 60 and Hazel-Atlas
motions, and denied those motions without further discussion. See Dist. Ct. Mem. Order
at 4. The District Court likewise denied Reynolds’ latest bail motion. See id. at 5.
Accordingly, his petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel the District Court to
dispose of these motions is moot.
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To the extent Reynolds may be seeking to challenge the District Court=s
disposition of his various post-judgment motions, such review is available in the form of
an appeal to this Court. A writ is not a substitute for an appeal; only if a direct appeal is
unavailable will the court determine whether a writ of mandamus will issue. See In re
Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 957 (3d Cir. 1997). We note that Reynolds has since
perfected an appeal from the District Court’s decision at C.A. No. 11-1839. Any
arguments he wishes to advance in support of that appeal should, of course, be included
in his filings submitted under that docket number.
Reynolds has also filed a motion in the instant proceeding seeking the
recusal of District Court Judge Kosik on the basis of personal bias. While a mandamus
petition is a proper means of challenging a district judge’s refusal to recuse himself
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455, see In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 774-75 (3d Cir.
1992), it does not appear that Judge Kosik has yet entertained Reynolds’ recusal motion.
Given that a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is only available where a
litigant has no other adequate means of obtaining the desired relief, we have recognized
that it would not be appropriate to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the
disqualification of a district judge if a motion for recusal is pending in the District Court.
See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2003). As was noted,
“[d]iscretion is confided in the district judge in the first instance to determine whether to
disqualify himself ... [because the] judge presiding over a case is in the best position to
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appreciate the implications of those matters alleged in a recusal motion.” Id. at 224
(quoting In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988)).
Because Reynolds continues to file motions in the District Court, see Mot. pending at D.
Ct. docket entry # 429, and Judge Kosik – who has presided over this case for the past six
years – has not yet ruled on the motion for recusal that Reynolds filed on January 27,
2011, we conclude that he has not demonstrated that mandamus relief is warranted.
We likewise conclude that mandamus relief is not warranted as a result of
the amount of time Reynolds’ motion has been pending on the District Court docket.
Although an appellate court may issue a writ of mandamus on the ground that undue
delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction, see Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d
74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996), the manner in which a court controls its docket is discretionary. In
re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982). Given the fact that the
mandamus petition Reynolds submitted to the District Court is captioned in this Court, it
is questionable whether the District Court even realized it was a filing that was in need of
a disposition. Accordingly, we conclude that there has been no undue delay on the part
of the District Court in disposing of Reynolds’ petition. Now that Reynolds has clarified
his intent to have Judge Kosik rule on his mandamus petition despite it having been
addressed to this Court, we are confident that a ruling will be forthcoming in the near
future.
Reynolds’ motions for the admission of facts and to compel the admission
of facts under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3), for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 56, and for a bail release hearing based on the admission of facts will also be
denied. Rules 36 and 56 are applicable to proceedings pending in the District Court, and
Reynolds’ challenge to the District Court’s denial of his motion for bail and/or a bail
hearing is within the purview of his appeal at C.A. No. 11-1839. Pursuant to Third
Circuit Local Appellate Rule 9.1, an appeal from such an order shall be by motion filed
either concurrently with or promptly after filing a notice of appeal. Thus, Reynolds
should file his bail motion in that appellate proceeding if he has not done so already.
Reynolds’ recently filed “Omnibus Motion Under F.R.A.P. 31(a)(1) and F.R.Civ.P.
36(a)(3)” is likewise denied. Once again, Rule 36 is applicable to proceedings in the
District Court. The filing of an answer or any briefing required by the Court in a
mandamus proceeding is governed by Fed. R. App. P. 21(b)(1) and (5).
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